the admissibility of court decision review by the Supreme Court on the basis of so-called diformity.
3 Th e new regulation of access to the highest segment of the system of general courts became a topic for discussion already before the adoption thereof, in particular as regards the impact the Constitutional Court made by its decision, fi le No. Pl. ÚS 29/11 of February 21, 2012, aff ecting the provision of § 237 in the wording preceding the appellative amendment. Eff ective as of December 31, 2012, the Court subrogated the provision § 237 section 1 c) 4 , which at non-diform decisions conditioned the admissibility of appellative review by legal issue of substantial importance, with the reasoning that application of the provision causes infringement of the right to fair trial and leads to discretion, when the Supreme Court would admit appellative review unpredictably and without a uniform approach. Th erefore, as we may say with a certain hyperbole 5 , the Constitutional Court followed from the presumption of objectively ascertainable diformity of the decision as the fundamental and only criterion for admissibility of appellative review, but the appellative amendment cancels diformities, and newly formulates the provision of § 237 Code of Civil Procedure.
It is not the purpose of this paper to evaluate the new legal regulation of appellative review as a whole, but to look at the new formulation of admissibility of appellative review as the only extraordinary remedial measure in the Czech civil procedure 6 , in comparison with the certiorari institute. Th e certiorari institute, or certiorari attitude, will be in this article examined not only as an institute to govern admissibility of review by the highest judicial instance in the United States of America, but as a type of remedial measure based on the selection by the reviewing body. 7 Th e reason for the choice of this special institute was the statement by the Constitutional Court, that subjected the cancelled provision of Section 237 (1) the participants and would be bound by a legal period of one month eff ectiveness of the appellative court's decision. On the other hand, in order to protect the courts that decide appellative reviews from being overloaded with by the reviews, oft en useless, it is necessary to determine which decisions and for what reasons may he decisions be contested by appellate review". For more information see Explanatory note to act No. 519/1991 Coll., amending and supplementing the Code of Civil Procedure and the Notarial Procedure, source: ASPI.
3 Th e previous legislative regulation distinguished diformity expressly stated in section 237, paragraph (1)a of the Code of Civil Procedure, and hidden diformity -Section § 237 paragraph (1)b of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4 In the wording preceding the appellative amendment. 5 Said with a certain hyperbole, since the Constitutional Court has not a priori stated that admissibility is possible only by diformities; for its reasons see herein below.
6 Th e Code of Civil Procedure recognises action for nullity of judgement and action for a new trial as extraordinary remedial measures. However, they cannot be considered as remedial measures from the viewpoint of theory of civil procedural law, since they fail to meet all the required criteria. Devolutive eff ect is missing at action for nullity and as concerns action for a new trial, in addition to the absence of the devolutive eff ect, we emphasise its very purpose, which is not the review of the contested decision, but a new hearing of the case, in consequence of which a legal regulation of an action for a new trial cannot be grounded on any of the remedial systems. 
Certiorari as an institute of the law of the United States of America
Certiorari is concerned where admissibility of remedial measure is based on a selection, or individual decision determining the circumstances of each case. Th e term comes from the Latin certioro, certionem facio that also means to admit.
9 As concerns legal systems, certiorari is generally considered one of remedial means to correct erroneous judgments in the Anglo-American legal system -common law. Within this system, the Supreme Court is the top judicial body and annually decides only several dozen causes. At its discretion, the Supreme Court selects cases of parties that appeal thereto through an application for certiorari. Th e Supreme Court chooses out of the cases only those from which it intends to make a precedent, alter a previous precedent, or a case where another important issue is to be decided upon. Th e opposite to the Anglo-American legal system is the continental system called civil law, in which the Supreme Court primarily holds the position of a corrector of inferior court decisions.
10
Most typically, certiorari is connected with the access to the Supreme Court of the United States of America and it occupies a very specifi c place within the judicial system of the federal state. In the U.S.A., the state and federal courts operate in parallel. Individual states have their own judicial systems, which are unique, and two identical ones are impossible to fi nd. Beside state courts, there operate the already mentioned federal courts, whereas citizens fall within jurisdictions of both judicial systems. Th e choice of the particular court system in which the case is to be heard depends on the merits of the case. It should be noted that most cases are heard by state courts.
11
Unlike state judicial system, the federal court structure is three-tiered. Judiciary on fi rst level is executed by districts courts, ninety-four in number. Each State therefore seats at least one district court; on the other hand none of the districts covers more than one State. Th e second level consists of courts of appeals, the number of which amounts to thirteen.
12 By their decisions, the appellative [quoted on January with almost exclusive control over its agenda, where it independently chooses (allows) the case that is to be heard. In the vast majority of cases that the Court denied to hear, the decision of the lower court remains valid. However, since the US Supreme Court will not provide any explanation to those rejected cases, the judicial rulings are of almost zero value.
20
Th e option for the US Supreme Court to choose, i.e. certiorari, has limited the number of cases resolved by the Supreme Court. Admissibility is based on the so-called "rule of four". Th e case may be reviewed only on account that four of the nine judges agree that the particular case is worth considering. Before the judges decide, each of them receives a copy of a petition for certiorari, so that aft er studying it they could decide whether the petition should be allowed or rejected. For that purpose the justices hold a meeting in camera. Chief Justice opens discussion on each case. When each justice has presented his opinion, they vote in reverse order of the length of service. If at least four justices agree that the case is worth full consideration, the petition is affi rmatively disposed, which is only then followed by a review and the Supreme court's decision. 21 , 22 However, certiorari is not based on judges´ decision without any rules. Th e criteria for consideration by the Supreme Court are stated by Rules of the US Supreme Court, part III., Rule 10. 23 Th ey set that review on a writ of certiorari is 30, 2013] . Available at <http://www.martindale.com/appellate-practice-law/article__1628446. htm>.
20 JANDA: Výzva demokracie…, p. 300. 21 SHANK: American Politics…, p. 396. 22 As concerns the actual course of proceedings before the US Supreme Court: Th e judges´ decision to hear the case (aft er the provision of certiorari) is followed by presentation of written argumentation of advocates to the parties. Th en comes an oral reasoning held before nine judges at open hearing. (See SHANK: American Politics…, p. 396). Each party is provided with thirty minutes for a speech. Th e judges do not decide on oral argumentation, they adopt their preliminary decision only aft er they have met at a common meeting. Th e course hereof is similar to the decision-making on review of applications for certiorari. Voting is conducted again in a reverse order accordingly to seniority. Having fi nished the voting, the judges in majority write the reasoning of the judgement. When all the judges agree on the court judgement and reasoning, unanimous opinion is concerned. Th e judgement is considered colliding if all the judges agree to the judgement statement, but diff er in reasoning. Also, there may appear circumstances when a judge holds a divergent opinion and does not agree with the court's decision. Dissenting and colliding opinions may be included in the reasoning of the judgement. See JANDA: Výzva demokracie…, p. 302. Aft er that, the presiding judge or another judge authorised by the presiding judge will produce a draft opinion. If the presiding judge has not voted for the majority-adopted judgement, the writing thereof or authorisation to do so shall belong to a judge who has voted for the majority opinion and who has served the longest tenure at the court. Once the draft opinion has been worked up, each judge will receive a copy to study. Each judge will send his notes and comments to others. Draft opinion may be rewritten repeatedly, also the judges may decide to change the judgement, but only until the statement is offi cially pronounced. Reaching an unanimous opinion among the judges is therefore rather diffi cult. not a matter if right, but of judicial discretion. It is further stipulated that a petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. Th e US Supreme Court chooses and followingly resolves only cases where: a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in confl ict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter or has decided an important federal question in a way that confl icts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, so as to call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power; b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that confl icts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States court of appeals; c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that confl icts with relevant decisions of this Court.
A petition for a writ of certiorari will exceptionally be granted when the alleged error consists of erroneous fact-fi ndings or improper use of duly chosen legal provision. An application for a review of a case where a lower instance court's judgment has not yet been delivered will only be admitted in the event of emerging urgent public interest, so that the Supreme Court could correct the usual appellative practice and request immediate decision by that court. 24 In American law, certiorari may be felt as a real discretion. Th e Supreme Court USA has certain rules in its Order to admit certiorari, though the rules are not of an exhaustive nature and the decision is fully at the Court's discretion. 
laid down that appellative review is permissible against a judgment of a court of appeal and against a resolution by a court of appeal, by which a decision of the fi rst-instance level court has been confi rmed, if appellative review is not admissible pursuant to letter b) and the appellate review
24 Just to make a complementary note on the American legal system: Review of a certain case may be considerably aff ected by the Attorney General, who is appointed by the president and represents the federal government before the Supreme Court. Among his duties belongs deciding on whether the government shall appeal against judgement by lower courts, and further he performs reviews and possible changes in lodgings where the government appeals. Th e Attorney General may also lodge a written application to a court of appellate review, called amicus curiae (a friend of the court). With approval by the court, this institute allows individuals or groups to support a particular party by arguments, without being a party to the case. Th erefore, the court of appellative review was entitled to select decisions against which it would admit appellative review and against which it would not. Th e Code of Civil Procedure comprised certain rules, though not an exhaustive list. Similarly to the US system it meant discretion, but more limited and entrusted to only a three-member bench, for a decision of which a plain majority would suffi ce. In this form the Czech legislation corresponded with certain features of remedial measures of the certiorari type.
Th e Constitutional Court, during the course of deciding upon repealing the provision § 237 section 1 point c), had to deal with the very existence of a legal regulation similar to certiorari in the Czech legal order. Even though discretionary attracting of cases is not primarily concerned, admissibility of appellative review on the grounds of assessment of an issue of law of substantial importance follows from the approach aiming to create inspiring court decisions or case-law, representing a very important source of interpretation of law, sometimes binding for the courts. Th e fact, that as concerns non-claimable appellative review, correction of a particular deviation is not the objective of the Supreme Court's decision, as it is the provision of a relevant opinion from the highest court instance where the legal regulation is unclear or diff erently interpreted, is 25 Admissibility based on discretion of a court of appellative review is not a rule in our neighbouring countries. Both in Austria and Germany there are appellate review courts that assess if the decision delivered thereby is of substantial importance form the legal viewpoint. Th e rule is set in Section 543 (2) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung) "Das Revisionsgericht ist an die Zulassung durch das Berufungsgericht gebunden". In the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure (also Zivilprozessordnung), the rule is laid similarly by Section 500, paragraph 2, points 2 and 3.
26 Until the so-called overall amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure introduced by Act No. 7/2009 Coll., the situations where the decision solved an issue at variance with substantive law were considered a legal point of substantial importance. However, this was omitted from the Code of Civil Procedure. Although the explanatory report to the act does not explicitly say so, we may assume that the legal point of substantial importance was in this case omitted in order to enhance appellate review as a measure to unify case-law to the detriment of remedial measures for a specifi c decision. It is not suffi cient for a decision by the court of appellate review if concerned is a decision grounded on erroneous determination of law in the case. Also concerned must be a question that has not yet been resolved or has been solved diff erently. Individual deviation of a judge who has not respected the current case-law of the Supreme Court cannot as such establish admissibility of appellate review. apparent already from the above mentioned legal regulation introduced by Act No. 7/2009 Coll.
While concerning legitimacy of the certiorari principle in the system of general courts, the Constitutional Court also addressed the Offi ce of the Government Agent for representation of the Czech Republic before the European Court of Human Rights, with the application for determination of this court's decisions, in which the certiorari construction is assessed positively, and for his opinion as concerns accordance thereof with the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Th e Offi ce of the Government Agent did not fi nd any breach of Article 6 of the Convention in certiorari 27 , or in principle did not fi nd any breach thereof in the legal regulation contained in Section 237 of the Code of Civil Proceedings in the wording valid until December 31, 2013. 28 Simultaneously, the Constitutional Court primarily challenged the accordance of admissibility of appellative review pursuant to Section 237 (1)(c) with predictability of adjudication, which must be, e.g. pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, considered a principle of a state respecting the rule of law. 29 In its decision-making the Court eventually proceeded in two directions: by assessment of admissibility of non-claimable appellative review as such, or admissibility of an approach similar to certiorari in the Czech legal order at all, following with application of provision of Section 237 (1)(c) in the actual practice of the Supreme Court.
As concerns assessment of admissibility of certiorari, the Constitutional Court in the fi nal version held a very reserved opinion. Th e Court considered assessment of the second issue in question as the core of its decision, i.e. the application practice of the Supreme Court and predictability thereof; therefore the Court has not expressed a concrete opinion as concerns existence of an institute similar to certiorari in the Czech legal order. 
by its decision it does not give a general opinion on the issue of the option of actual "selection" of cases, i.e. on the institute of certiorari, or on the institute of admissibility of application, since the Court does not see any reason for that under the indicated circumstances.
30 Th e Court gave that opinion despite the fact that it had considered the issue of constitutionality of such an institute in its earlier judgement. Eventually, the Constitutional Court only reminded that this institute may hardly be employable in the conditions of the Supreme Court, decisions of which must remain fully reviewable as concerns constitutionality within proceedings on constitutional complaints. 31 Specifi cally from that viewpoint, the Constitutional Court blamed the legal regulation of appellative review eff ective till December 31 for the fact that unlike certiorari in the U.S.A. or e.g. decision-making in Germany upon rejection of appellative review for absence of legal point of substantial importance, a three-member bench decides by mere majority of votes; thus there is no need even of an unanimous decision, or decision of a larger (or more-member) body, respectively.
32 Th erefore, if we compare the position of a participant who seeks appellative review against a confi rming decision, with that of a participant who applies for certiorari, the position of the American applicant may look better, since the issue of necessity of review is decided upon by not only all judges of the US Supreme Court, but their minority will suffi ce (four of nine) 33 , while the Czech appellant may be "left at the mercy" of two judges out of a three-member bench, regardless the opinion of other judges of the Supreme Court. 33 Th e "rule of four" see hereinabove. 34 As concerns this comparison, we identify ourselves with the Z. Kühn's opinion that concerned is comparing of the incomparable, or, respectively, it is necessary to repeat again the above mentioned, i.e. that the US Supreme Court always decide as a unit, not in partial benches, while the Czech Supreme Court never decides as a unit. See KÜHN, Zdeněk. 
36
Th us, we may sum up that the Constitutional Court was dissatisfi ed "only" with non-uniform decisions by the supreme Court pursuant to § 237 (1c) of the Code of Civil Proceedings and in principle it has not found unconstitutionality in admissibility of access to the supreme judicial instance based on selection, i.e. a certain discretion from the side thereof under the criteria set by law.
37 Th e Court has reserved an opinion that as concerns an institute similar to certiorari, the solution is inappropriate in the Czech legal environment. Th e conclusions of the Constitutional Court may seem this way at least. However, we incline to the Kühn's opinion that appeared immediately aft er publication of the judgement, stating that the judgement by the Constitutional Court in practice disqualifi es the arrangement of the legal regulation of admissibility of appellative review on the basis of selection.
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In fact, the Constitutional Court in the recital of law in the statement reserves for the legislators that it intends to respect the free will of the legislator, which it will incorporate into the new regulation of appellative review, the Court neverthe- 37 For the purpose of this article, we disregard the very contradictoriness of that process since we intend to concentrate on the attitude by the Constitutional Court to the certiorari institute. We nevertheless remind the concurring opinion of judge Kůrka, who aptly noted: "Fully in accordance with that in point 10 of the judgement,
the Constitutional Court recognises the assessment of the "design of remedial measures in the system of general courts of a certiorari kind" fi led by the Offi ce of the Government Agent for representation of the Czech Republic before the European Court of Human Rights (hereinaft er also "ECHR"), to which the Offi ce has been invited in the given issue. From there follows not only that the ECHR recognises it generally acceptable ("in principle, it is not in variation with Article 6(1) of the Convention"), but also factually, that the ECHR approves it in situations where "internal law enables rejection of a remedial measure for the reason that it does not rise any important legal question " (which is exactly "our" case!)
, and moreover, as concerns reasoning for such rejection, "it may suffi ce when the particular court restricts itself to reference to a legal provision that enables that procedure for the court, without giving detailed arguments" (note: should not this be suffi cient for majority in the plenary session to be more self-restrained?) . less reminds that the regulation must be predictable to such extent that admissibility of appellative review must be apparent to every possible appellant even before such an appellant makes use of the remedial measure in the form of appellative review. In point 53 the Court infers an imperative by which the rules of access to higher degrees of jurisdiction must be formulated as concrete as possible so that they would be most clearly understandable for individual persons. Th is is because exactly those rules set the limits and manners by which the injured person may seek its rights. Should everyone, already at the moment when he holds in his hands a judgement by the court of appeal, be sure whether an extraordinary remedial measure is admissible or not, then a non-claimable appellative review could succeed. Finally, it is necessary to remind that non-claimable appellative review, or the option of choice, is not convenient for the Constitutional Court also for the reason that Supreme Court decisions may be subject to revision by the Constitutional Court and the individual selection makes the assessment of admissibility of constitutional complaint rather complicated.
39

New legal regulation
Th us the Constitutional Court did not make the role of the legislators any easier. Even though it determined that a legal regulation based on selection does not bother in principle, the court simultaneously burdened the legislators with an unenviable task of formulating thereof so that it would prevent unpredictable decisions. From the two ways that emerged aft er the publication of the judgement Pl. ÚS 29/11, i.e. maintenance of admissibility of appellative review only on the principle of diformities, which undoubtedly meet the requirement of predictability, and an attempt to newly defi ne the admissibility of appellative review on the basis of an eff ort to unify case-law, the legislators have chosen the latter. We believe that they did right. Leaving admissibility of appellative review only up to variances between judgements of fi rst and second instance courts may be a clearly defi ned rule on admissibility of a remedial measure, but in our opinion this is not in conformity with the purpose that appellative review should fulfi l in the Czech Legal order.
On the contrary, as already mentioned herein above, the new legal regulation of appellative review abolishes admissibility based solely on diformities, and in provision of Section 237 CCP it introduces an entirely new design of admissibility of appellative review. But in fact, the legislators in the explanatory report to the appellative review amendment state that upon formulating thereof they took into account the judgement by the Constitutional Court Pl. ÚS 29/11 40 and for that reason they pursue introduction of entirely new defi ni-39 Conformingly ibid. 40 Ironically, for the purposes of the appellative review amendment, out of it were produced three tion for admissibility of appellative review and measures which will introduce a more qualifi ed way of decision-making as concerns admissibility of appellative review. (1) CCP, a court of appellative review is newly obliged to decide on admissibility of appellative review within six moths from the day that the case has been placed before that court. Furthermore, the new rule also clearly states that rejection of appellative review must be decided upon unanimously by the bench. (Section 243c(2) CCP).
Th e Appellative review amendment omits the term "legal point of substantial importance" in the legal regulation of the Czech civil procedural law. Th e term, under infl uence of the Constitutional Court's interpretations oft en considered vague and leading to unpredictable decisions, has been repealed from the Czech legal order and replaced by conditions under which appellative review is admissible. In fact, these have been inspired by what has been considered a legal point of substantial importance. Moreover, the new provision of Section 237 CCP additionally specifi es that an issue of substantive and also procedural law must be concerned. If we look at the new legal regulation from the certiorari viewpoint, or design of a remedial measure based on selection, respectively, then we may doubt if the new regulation still maintains this principle. Th e appellative review amendment, fully within the intent of the Constitutional Court judgement, pursues certainty of admissibility of appellative review. At the fi rst sight, it may seem that the conditions of admissibility are clear for the appellant and he could in advance assess the chance that his appellative review would be admitted. In contrary to the legal regulation valid until December 31, 2013, the new legal legislation does not permit any discretion for the Supreme Court as concerns what the Court could consider a legal issue of substantial importance, beyond the limits formerly exhaustively defi ned by Section 237(3) CCP. Th e conditions set by Section 237 CCP as amended by the appellative review amendment are exhaustive and appellative review cannot be admitted if they have not been met. Compared to the American attitude, the diff erence is rather signifi cant. Th e Rules of the Supreme Court as of a recommending nature; the judges may consider an allegedly erroneous application of a legal regulation beyond the Rules if at least four judges (by the rule of four) come to the conclusion that certiorari is necessary to admit. Hence, we may sum up that the current legislation has completely gone astray from the certiorari attitude and the Supreme Court has no choice. Th erefore, once claimable appellative review is concerned and the condition of admissibility is given, then the Supreme Court has no choice.
At the same time, we would like to make an observation on the following. It is obvious that the court of appellative review has no option but to justify admissibility of appellative review by one of the cases contained in § 237 CCP. However, the conditions of admissibility are of a diff erent nature than those of so-called diformities. It is not the procedural state of the decision -only a mere change in the decision by a court of appeal was suffi cient for diformity. Appellative review as a means to unify case-law should only be chosen where the issue of substantive of procedural law has not yet been resolved in the Czech judicial practice by a supreme judicial instance decision, or where it should be solved diff erently. It is only the Supreme Court judges who may decide upon the diff erent solution. Th eir decision therefore depends on their judgement if the given issue is necessary to solve or if it is necessary to solve in a way different from current case-law. It is not given by the mere procedural state of the case, but primarily rather by consideration under substantive law ( consideration of importance of the issue as concerns unifi cation of case-law). Th e decision if an already solved issue will be considered again and diff erently, is in principle made only by judges of an appellative review court, who have the option within statutory limits. Th e legal regulation approximates the nature of appellative review to a certiorari remedial measure also by the change in the voting ratio, when newly one vote of three suffi ces for a review of the appellate court decision on the basis of appellative review.
Th ese are only partial issues, and in general, we should repeat the above mentioned, i.e. that the new legal regulation of appellative review has undoubtedly departed from the certiorari attitude by far. Selection, or a choice of procedure may be talked about only if the current legislature changes; as concerns the issue of deviation of an appellative court or an issue not yet solved, the procedure of courts of appellative review is bound by the rules and requirements for minimum reasoning of the judgement defi ned so clearly that a real choice is out of question. In the reasoning of an adverse decision, the court of appellate review should always indicate the decision that has already solved the issue and reasons why it is not necessary to reopen it gain, respectively.
Despite the above mentioned conclusions of the Government Agent and conformity of admissibility of a remedial measure based on selection by the highest judicial instance with Article 6 of the Constitution, i.e. by the right to fair trial 43 , the Czech legal environment, for the time being, has not vested such confi dence in its highest segment in the system of general courts. Admissibility of appellative review, which was originally based on assessment of a legal point of substantial importance with an exhaustive list of its content, that was, though 43 Article 6 of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms reads as follows: 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal off ence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal off ence has the following minimum rights: a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not suffi cient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court. in only several features, similar to the American certiorari approach, is getting stricter with the aim to determine clear rules, within the limits of which the Supreme court may operate. Th e option of choice is signifi cantly limited for the Court; moreover, it is always subject to checking as concerns constitutionality. As it may seem from the above stated, the courts of appellative review are not provided with confi dence for assessment based on profound analysis of substantive law and determination of importance of the issue, and the Czech legal practice prefers building upon clearly defi ned rules, of a procedural nature at the best. It is not appropriate to speak about a certiorari approach here, as the option of choice is rather limited, in some cases almost hypothetical.
It is diffi cult to judge if the limitation of discretion of the Supreme Court is the right way. However, we would like to add a fi nal note. In our opinion, the reason for the alteration of the legal regulation was the question of the judges´ individual approach that would lead to unpredictable and non-uniform decisions, rather than the issue of the legal regulation as such. We assume that the institute of certiorari in its pure form is not immediately doomed to strict rejection. On the contrary -the option to assess the importance of the legal question to be resolved provides space to unify case law and may inspire the legal order. Th e still remaining distrust towards judiciary (in all its levels and instances) should not always lead to the eff ort to make legal regulations formally stricter and to introduce only technical rules, as that might hurt sometimes.
